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John Barnes*

The Law Reform
Commission of Canada

The work of the Law Reform Commission of Canada prompts a
reconsideration of our understanding of the meaning and process of
law reform. 1 After referring to one recent attempt in England to
change the law of evidence in criminal cases, I will review certain
misconceptions about the meaning of law reform and then consider
the extent to which these misconceptions have been avoided by the
Canadian commission.
1.

The English CriminalLaw Revision Committee

It is now some two years since the publication of that ill-starred
exercise in law reform, the Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law
*John Barnes, Assistant Professor of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa.
The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and assistance of Professor D. W.
Elliott of the Department of Law, Carleton University, and the members and staff
of the Law Reform Commission of Canada.
1. The establishment, original membership, staffing, program and organisation of
the commission are described by M. L. Friedland in "The Work of the Law
Reform Commission of Canada" (1972), 6 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette
58. A number of institutional points should be noted:
(1) The commission is a statutory body created by the Law Reform Commission
Act, R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23. In theory the commission is independent of the
government of the day and answerable only to Parliament. It is not a part of the
Department of Justice but the Minister of Justice does exercise a number of controls
over the commission.
(2) (a) The approval of the Minister is required for by-laws made by the
commission "fixing the remuneration to be paid to part-time members of the
Commission for attendance at meetings of the Commission, or meetings of any
committees thereof that they are requested by the chairman to attend, and the
travelling and living expenses to be paid to members." R.S.C. 1970, 1st. Supp.
c.23, s. 10(c). The amounts for remuneration and expenses paid by the Commission
to temporary research personnel are also subject to the Minister's approval.
R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s.7(2).
(b) For practical purposes the commission's budget needs to be approved by the
Minister of Justice.
(c) The commission's program of proposed study must be laid before Parliament
by the Minister but that program is subject to the Minister's approval. R.S.C.,
1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s. 12(1) (c), (d), s. 18. Reports on studies completed by the
Commission must be submitted to the Minister who must then lay them before
Parliament. R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, ss. 16,18. When laying a commission
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program before Parliament the Minister must include "a statement
indicating any item or items proposed by the Commission and not approved'", and
in the case of a report, "such comments, if any, as the Minister sees fit." R.S.C.,
1970, 1st. Supp. c.23,s. 18. The Minister can insist that priority of study ina study
program be given to a subject named by him. R.S.C. 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23,
s. 12(2). The approval procedure involved in the Act is criticised in an editorial in
(1970-71), 13 C.L.Q. 133. However, the Act does not permit the Minister of
Justice to control how the commission will work once its program and priorities are
settled. Neither does it allow him to amend recommendations of the Commission.
(d) Section 17 of the Act requires the Commission each year to "prepare and
submit to the Minister a report containing a summary of its activities under this Act
for the immediately preceding year, in such form and containing such information
with respect to any studies or other activities undertaken or directed by it as the
Minister may direct."
(3) Departments of the Government of Canada are required to provide advice
and assistance requested by the commission. R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s. 14.
(4) The members authorised to be appointed by the Act have a fixed tenure not
exceeding seven years for the four full-time members and three years for the two
part-time members, and they can be removed only for cause. Three of the full-time
commissioners as well as one of the part-time members must be members of the
legal profession. R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s.4. Thus it is possible to appoint
non-lawyers as members of the commission. Also, although the commission is a
permanent body, its members may not be, thereby allowing for the injection of new
energies and ideas by changes of personnel. However, "a member of the
Commission is eligible to be reappointed in the same or another capacity." R.S.C.,
1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s.4(2).
(5) The Act facilitates the involvement of the judiciary in the work of the
commission by permitting the appointment of persons in receipt of a salary or
annuity under the Judges Act without the need of their relinquishing judicial office.
R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s.4(3).
(6) Provision is made for representation in the membership of commission of
both the common law and civil systems: R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s.4(3).
(7) The commission may undertake joint projects with other law commissions in
Canada. R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s. 13. Clearly co-operative efforts with
provincial commissions in fields such as family law and evidence are highly
desirable in the Canadian system. In fact the only joint study undertaken is with the
Manitoba Law Reform Commission on contempt of court.
(8) The members of the Commission are named below. The staff of the
commission consists of Mr. Jean C&6t, Secretary, Judge Ren6 J. Matin, Special
Assistant and Co-ordinator, Colonel (Retd.) H. G. Oliver, Director of Operations
and, until recently, approximately twenty-five research personnel. The in-house
research staff was originally divided into eight project groups: general principles of
criminal law and regulated conduct, criminal procedure, sentencing and
disposition, evidence, family law, administrative law, commercial law and
expropriation. At any particular time, approximately fifty "outside" persons have
been contracted to work on topics. within the eight projects; these are mainly
professors in law faculties but include judges, practising lawyers, officers of the
Clarke Institute of Psychiatry in Toronto, professors of psychology and research
officers. The former practice was for each study group to have an in-house project
leader and two commissioners. The group's proposals when formulated would be
submitted to all commissioners for consideration before publication. It is now
understood that a reorganisation of the internal structure of the Commission may
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Revision Committee, 2 a report remarkable for provoking almost as
much criticism of its research methods as of its substantive
proposals. 3 However, the evaluation of the work of a law reform
committee involves more than an examination of its substantive
recommendations. Apart from the merits of actual proposals, there
are six questions to be considered: What were the aims of the
committee? What are the merits of those aims? What was the
method of achieving the aims? What are the merits of that method?
What research technique was used? What are the merits of that
technique?
Rupert Cross, a member of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee, answered the first question in the course of a general
reply to criticisms of the committee's report:
I recognise that the Report contains some unsupported statements about
the doings of sophisticated professional criminals and the extent to
which the present rules of evidence lead to wrongful acquittals. I do not
wish to deny this possibility, but I would now wish to stress the need for
rationalising the law of evidence. I think most of the provisions of the
Bill can be justified on this ground .... The prime beneficiary of the
sort of law reform that comes from the Criminal Law Revision
Committee is the lawyer of the future rather than the practitioner of the
present who, whatever his age, is, like the writer, an old dog conscious
of the difficulty of learning new tricks. It follows that I attach little, if
any, importance to the charge that the committee did not commission
any empirical research. Even if it were the case that the present rules of
evidence produced no wrongful acquittals, I would still be in favour of
most if not all of the committee's recommendations for the simple
take place. The proposal is to have fewer in-house research personnel, to eliminate
the division into project groups and to hold general meetings at which all members
and in-house research staff attend.
2. Evidence (General) Cmnd. 4991 June 1972.
3. J.A. Coutts, "Reform of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases" (1973), 1
Dalhousie L. J. 151; C. Tapper, "Evidence (General): Eleventh Report of the
Criminal Law Revision Committee" (1972), 35 M.L.R. 621, "Criminal Law
Revision Committee Eleventh Report: Character Evidence" (1973), 36 M.L.R. 56,
167; A. A. S. Zuckerman, "Criminal Law Revision Committee Eleventh Report,
Right of Silence" (1973), 36 M.L.R. 509; B. Hogan, "Criminal Law Revision
Committee's Eleventh Report: A Summary" [1972] Crim. L.R. 468; Sir B.
MacKenna, "Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report: Some
Comments" [1972] Crim. L.R. 605; Glanville Williams, "The Proposals for
Hearsay Evidence" [1973) Crim. L.R. 76, "The New Proposals in Relation to
Double Hearsay and Records" [1973] Crim. L.R. 139; R. Cross, "The Evidence
Report: Sense or Nonsense [1973] Crim. L.R. 329, "Clause 3 of the Draft
Criminal Evidence Bill, Research and Codification" [1973] Crim. L.R. 400; A.
Muir, "The Rules of the Game" [1973] Crim. L.R. 341; C. J.Miller, "Silence
and Confessions - What are they worth?" [1973] Crim. L.R. 343. Hansard H. L.
Deb., Vol. 338, cols. 1546et seq.
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reason that their adoption would spare the judge from talking gibberish
to the jury, the conscientious magistrate from directing himself in
imbecile terms, and the writer on the law of evidence from drawing
distinctions absurd
enough to bring a blush to the most hardened
4
academic fact."
The aim of the committee then was the modernisation, rationalisation and simplification of the written rules of evidence. The
intended beneficiary was the law student, who would have available
a body of rules easy to state and learn. In relation to the second
question, namely, the aims of the committee, we can say that the
aim of merely re-writing the rules involves the (familiar) positivist
danger of believing that there is no more to a legal system than
formal rules. This aim is not necessarily bad but it can be bad if
accompanied by a narrow conception of the legal system.
The method of achieving the object was draft legislation. The
danger of this method is that it may be accompanied by an
underlying belief that the "law" of evidence is the "laws" or
"rules" of evidence, that study of the rulebook is a study of the
legal system, and that changing the rules is changing all. To this we
could add that, since statutory rule-writing in common law systems
has traditionally been poorly done, the tools with which the
committee must implement its aims may be defective. It has in fact
been suggested by E. C. S. Wade that legislation is a disincentive to
effect change. "Another factor which makes lawyers hesitate to
recommend radical change is the knowledge that such change can
only be achieved by legislation." 5 Legislation may not be a means
of change at all. Our modem conception of its function may have
deluded us. In early times, legislation was an act of publication or
promulgation of the details of existing practices and customs. 6 It
was a means of communication, not of deliberate change. Only later
did the idea develop that intentional changes would be made by
writing new statutes.
Various research techniques of the committee drew fire7 : its
part-time deliberations had apparently taken eight years; it had kept
its ideas secret and experienced the embarrassment of a "leak"; it
had failed to publish working papers indicating in advance the drift
of its recommendations; it seemed to base its recommendations on
4. R. Cross, op. cit., at 332-3.
5. "The Machinery of Law Reform" (1961), 24 M.L.R. 3,7.
6. Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (rev. ed. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1954) 4.
7. J. A. Coutts, op. cit., at 151-4.
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the personal reminiscences of eminent committee members and
persons consulted by the committee; it did not use empirical
research to justify its assumptions and recommendations; its
consultations with outside bodies seemed to have been inadequate.
A number of features of the report were unfortunate; for example, it
referred occasionally to accused as criminals; most of its
recommendations favoured the prosecution. The technique, then,
was discussion in committee by eminent lawyers relying on
common sense and their own assumptions as to what was needed.
Few would argue that this is adequate given the availability of
modern research techniques and our understanding of the nature and
function of law.
Should law reform be the process of re-writing the rules? Until
recently we thought so. We have assumed that there were only two
ways of effecting law reform: judicial decision and statutory
change. Since law reform by judicial decision suffered from certain
familiar limitations, such as the doctrine of stare decisis, the
indeterminacy and vulnerability of case law, dependency on the
accidents of litigation, the pressure of individual interests, the fear
of giving unelected judges power to make wide social and
institutional changes, the inability of judges to engage in extensive
research and consultation, we embraced the alternative possibility
and assumed that statute-writing was the proper job for a
commission s . Friedmann, however, has identified a number of
"instruments of legal change", namely, a strong social groundswell
of habit and opinion, and the work of a determined group pursuing
legal change in the face of governmental lethargy and indifferent
public opinion. 9 The objection might be taken that these are ways of
bringing legal change about and that legal change only occurs when
public feeling is embodied in court decisions or legislation.
However, this objection is itself open to criticism: it derives, again,
from a legalistic or positivist conception of law. When habit,
official practice, and public opinion render a rule of law
inoperative, a legal change is effected, for practical purposes. Why
should we reserve the term "legal change" for the mere formal
ratification which may follow? In this light, we can conceive of law
8. See N. Marsh's formulation of the disadvantages of judicial law reform in
"Law Reform in the United Kingdom: A New Institutional Approach" (1971), 13
William and Mary L.R. 263, 266 et seq.
9. W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (2nd.ed..New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972), at 25.
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commissions as social reformers or social innovators, as purveyors
of new ideas. Why not conceive of a commission as Friedmann's
"determined group" seeking to move public opinion?
The English Law Reform Commission was modelled in part on
the English Law Revision Committee, 1934-1939, whose terms of
reference were "to consider how far, having regard to statute law
and judicial decisions, such legal maxims and doctrines as the Lord
Chancellor may from time to time refer to the Committee require
revision in modem conditions". Its work consisted in making
technical revisions to the law. 10 It was also modelled on the
post-war English law reform committee and was designed largely to
provide full-time staff and permanent facilities for systematic work
on all aspects of the law."1 Today we are beyond the point of having
to ask why we need permanent law reform agencies.' 2 We are now
at the stage of considering how a law reform body should work in
practice and what should be its philosophy and function.' 3 Lord
Gardiner is perhaps not quite right in saying of the English and
that everybody would agree that
Scottish law commissions "....
[they] have been an unqualified success. They have won the
confidence of the judiciary, the Bar, the Law Society, the academic
lawyers and, I think, the general public."'14 J. Munkman, for one,
10. The work of the committee is described by E. C. S. Wade, op. cit., at 10-13.;
R. L. Deech, "Law Reform: The Choice of Method" (1969), 47 Can. Bar Rev.
395, 402-3; and J. H. Farrar, Law Reform and the Law Commission (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1974) 9-11, 133-34.
11. G. Gardiner and A. Martin (eds.), Law Reform NOW (London: Gollancz,
1963); L. Scarman, Law Reform - The New Pattern (London: Rutledge & Paul,
1968), "Lawyers and Law Reform" (1966), 19 C.L.P.1, "Law Reform by
Legislative Techniques" (1967), 32 Sask. L.J. 217.
12. B. Cardozo, "A Ministry of Justice" (1921-22), 35 Harv. L.R. 113; J. Stone
and G. S. Pettee, "Revision of Private Law" (1940), 54 Harv. L.R. 221; G.
Gardiner, "The Machinery of Law Reform in England" (1953), 69 L.Q.R. 46; R.
E. Megarry, "Law Reform" (1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. 691; J. G. Hall, "The
Machinery for Law Reform" (1959), 103 Sol. J. 865; Lord Devlin, Samples of
Law Making (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) 27; G. Gardiner and A.
Martin, op. cit.; C. Henry let al.], "National Law Reform Commission" 1966
Canadian Bar Association Papers 1 (1967):
13. R. D. Conacher, "Law Reform in Action and in Prospect" (1969), 43 A.L.J.
513; G. Sawer, "The Legal Theory of Law Reform" (1970), 20 University of
Toronto L.J. 183, 194-5; R. Gosse, "Canadian Law Reform Agencies" (1970), 1
Can. Bar. J. (N.S.) 1; N. Marsh, op. cit.; L. C. B. Gower, "Reflections on Law
Reform" (1973), 23 University of Toronto L.J. 257; J. H. Farrar, op. cit., at ch. 6,
7,9.
14. "The Role of the Lord Chancellor in the Field of Law Reform" (1971), 87
L.Q.R. 326,329.
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was surprised that on the change of Lord Chancellor in 1970 the law
commissions in Britain were not abolished.1 5 His thoughts on the
utility of the commissions derive more from an aversion to statute
law (in its traditional common law form) than from hostility to the
principle of a permanent law reform agency. Similarly John P.
Frank has criticised revisions which make the law more complex
and litigation more costly. Commenting on planned revisions, he
observes that ".

. .

. every one of these additions to the judicial

burden may be justified by considerations of justice, or of social
welfare, or of revenue, or whatever. Whether justified or not, they
all add to the load on the elephant." He recommends that technical
planning is not enough and that we should evaluate a piece of
reform "both in terms of its primary objectives and in terms of its
litigation consequences." 16 A law commission, then, which resists
the urge to think solely in terms revising the written rules avoids the
charges of fossilising the law in a rigid code and adding statutory
complication to the existing law. This should be an inducement to
develop a fresh approach to law reform.
2.

Law Reform Defined

A commission which departs from the traditional aims of law
reform meets the objection that it should have "proposals", that
these proposals should be new rules, and that the implementation of
the proposals should be by legislation. All reports of the
1
commission, it is said, should include a convenient draft bill. 6
The annual report should chart recommendations for Parliament and
the commission should be judged by its legislative pay-off rate. This
is the new-rules-for-old approach. So, when the Law Reform
Commission of Canada was established in 1971 the hope of the
editor of the CriminalLaw Quarterly was that, "before too long we
will have a Criminal Code second to none." 1 7 There was initial
pressure on the commission to revise obsolete or unsatisfactory
sections of the Criminal Code.
15. "Good and Bad Law Reform" (1974), 124 New Law Journal 81. The
importance of the form of legislation - the medium for law reform - is brought
out by J.H. Farrar, op. cit., at ch.5.
16. John P. Frank, American Law: The Case for Radical Reform (New York:
MacMillan, 1969) 109.
16a. Of course a draft bill is desirable if, after full study, it is resolved that
legislation is the most suitable method of achieving the change. What is undesirable
is the nearly-automatic assumption that legislation must be the method.
17. "National Law Reform Commission" (1970-71), 13 C.L.Q. 133, 134.
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From the traditional point of view, a law reform commission is
seen as a government advisory agency whose duties, set out in an
enabling statute, are to make studies and recommend changes in the
law with a view to its modernisation, simplification and
improvement. Such a commission has been conceived of as a
mediary between the courts and the legislature, a body to which
lawyers can send suggestions for reform, an agency that will
persuade legislatures to accept its proposals. Such a commission is
staffed exclusively by lawyers because, "it is difficult to believe
that a lay commissioner could . .

.

.usefully participate in the cut

and thrust of Commission debate on legal technicalities." 18 What
would be the aims of this body? It would obviously be expected to
rewrite the substantive rules of law and it might also be called upon
to simplify judicial structures and procedures, secure effective
administration in the machinery of justice, produce programs to
create better judges and jurors, recommend improved clinical
education in law schools or programs of training in judicial
administration and adjudication. Indeed the Pakistan law commission was set up to concentrate on problems of procedure and
administration, being required to study the efficiency of court
proceedings, the introduction of conciliation and the extension of
summary jurisdiction, legal aid, and ways of eliminating false pleas
and perjuries. 19 The importance of such work cannot be denied. As
a process of law reform, however, it involves no fundamental
reappraisal of the rule of law but rather a revision of procedures
within the existing system.
To repeat a question asked earlier: is law reform a process of
change through alteration of rules? A sample of views may be
useful. Of particular interest, and clearly influential in the
philosophy of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, is the
opinion of the Honourable John M. Turner who, as Minister of
Justice in 1970, introduced the bill to establish the national
commission: "For law is not just a 'technical body of rules; it is the
organising principle for the reconfiguration of society. Law is not
just an agency of social control; it articulates the values by which
men seek to live. The business of government, then, is the making
of laws, and the process of law reform goes to the core of defining
the kind of society we will have as a Canadian people and the kind
18. G. Sawer, op. cit., at 194.
19. Report of the Pakistan Law Commission, 1967-70.
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of rights which we will enjoy as individuals." 2 0 President Richard
M. Nixon: "The ultimate object of changing the process of justice is
not to put more people in jail or merely to provide a faster flow of
litigation; it is to resolve conflict speedily but fairly, to reverse the
trend towards crime and violence, to re-instill a respect for law in all
of our people." 2 1 J. N. Lyon: "Law reform is the process of
identifying and clarifying standards of performance for the legal
order and of finding and implementing ways of optimising
achievement of those standards".22 Jean Beetz: "Reform does not
necessarily mean change. It even implies some degree of
conservation, since to reform presupposes the preservation of that
which is being reformed, the modernisation and restoration of old
systems with a view to saving them by adapting them to new
circumstances." 2 3 William F. Swindler: "The terms 'modernisation, revision and reform' have no precisely distinguished meanings
in law dictionaries. In the context of this article, modernisation is
used to suggest a movement primarily designed to streamline
statutes or rules, usually by eliminating steps which the experience
of many years has demonstrated to be superfluous and obstructive.
Revision more specifically relates to a planned statutory overhaul of
procedural or substantive law. Reform is a term which should be
used sparingly, for it suggests, accurately, an attempt to introduce
new concepts into existing law." 24 J. N. Lyon: "Law reform may
be essentially an educational process . . . . having as its prime
objective the release and direction of human potential." 25 J. G.
Kneipp: "Most law reform, it seems to me, has proceeded so far on
the basis that the existing fundamentals of the subject in hand should
be retained. I suppose either because they are thought to be
satisfactory or because their reformulation would be too Herculean a
task. In this setting, law reform of course becomes largely a matter
of patchwork. It seems to me that the time has come to encourage at

20. "Law for the Seventies: A Manifesto for Law Reform" (1971), 17 McGill
L.J. 1,2.
21. (1972), 18 The Catholic Lawyer 2.
22. "Law Reform Needs Reform" (1974), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. no. 2.
23. "Reflections on Continuity and Change in Law Reform" (1972), 22 U. Tor.
L.J. 129, 138-9.
24. "Law Reform in the United Kingdom - Introductory Note: Revision and
Reform in the Common Law Countries" (1971), 13 William and Mary Law
Review 253.
25. Op. cit.
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a national level a more fundamental examination of our laws. ' 2 6
Lawrence M. Friedman: "The phrase, law reform, has no exact
objective meaning. When one uses it, one is, first of all, referring to
some program for changing the law. The word 'reform' implies that
the change is for the better ....",27
These views confirm that the end of law reform is the
improvement of the law. They also recognise the need to take
account of human values and official practices. But a further
question is raised: does law reform imply only change within the
existing system? It certainly allows for new concepts to be
introduced into the system, but can a process abolishing or
redesigning the system be styled "reform"? When we "re-form",
must the shape in the end substantially resemble the shape at the
start? The answer would appear to be "yes" in that approach to law
reform which looks only to the revision of rules, procedures and
institutions. Since we now accept that there is more to the legal
system than the rules, we must also accept that no fundamental
change will be made by changing the rules. Values and attitudes are
fundamental to the system; rules and practices merely reflect these
and it is only a change of values which will lead to a genuinely
different system. If a law reform commission aims at reforming law
by changing values, the consequence is that the new system may
bear no resemblance to the old one. Is that law reform? Perhaps not,
as we have traditionally understood the term; but should we
understand the term traditionally?
Now another question. Should a law commission have a single
aim as to what it is trying to change (rules, practices, attitudes or
values) in respect of all its projects or should its object vary with the
particular project? Take the projects of the Law Reform
Commission of Canada 28 : are administrative law, commercial law,
evidence and expropriation more suited to change by change of the
rules? Is changing the rules all that is required to achieve effective
change in these areas? Do criminal procedure and sentencing call
mainly for changes in official practices? Do criminal law and family
law demand changes of values and attitudes? What body is best
suited to pursue what changes and by what methods? Is there one
26. In R. D. Conacher, op. cit., at 523.
27. "Law Reform in Historical Perspective" (1968-69), 13 St. Louis L.J. 351.
28. The in-house and outside studies of the Commission are listed in the Second
Annual Report, 1972-73, 31-37.
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function for which, for example, the Department of Justice is better
suited and another for which the law commission is more
appropriate?
3. Research Techniques
Whether the question be aim, method or agency, one thing is
certain: a full understanding of the existing situation must be
obtained before we can know what is needed. Even though we
might suspect that certain topics are best handled by certain
methods, we cannot know this until we have examined the problem
in depth. And even if we should eventually decide to effect a reform
by rewriting the rules, that revision itself should reflect the facts of
the system and the popular attitudes on which it rests. Failure to take
these precautions was the error of the Eleventh Report. Research
technique, then, is crucial. It is in respect of its research technique
that the Law Reform Commission of Canada has at times and in
respect of some of its work been set apart from the traditional law
reform agency. Four methods are discernible: (1) Philosophical
Enquiry; (2) the Comparative Method; (3) Empirical Research; and
(4) Public Consultation.
PhilosophicalEnquiry: Philosphical enquiry par excellence is the
search for values. We have seen that it is only by a change of values
that fundamental changes can be achieved. By what authority does
the commission consider such matters? Section 11 of the Law
Reform Commission Act includes among the objects of the
commission "the development of new approaches to and new
concepts of the law in keeping with and responsive to the changing
needs of modem Canadian society and of individual members of
that society." 29 The precise meaning of this section is less than
clear but it can be interpreted as a statutory spur to innovate. It
seems to give the commission a mandate beyond the technical
revision of the law. Political encouragement to innovate also derives
from the progressive picture of law reform held by John M. Turner.
He saw the process as that "of defining the kind of society we will
have as a Canadian people and the kind of rights which we will
enjoy as individuals. "30 Given that he envisaged a philosophical
approach, the appointment to the commission of persons sympathetic to that method was inevitable. So, the first chairman of the
29. R.C.S., 1970, 1st Supp. c.23.
30. John M. Turner, op. cit., at 2.
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Commission, Mr. Justice E. Patrick Hartt, before turning to the
law, was a student of philosophy. 3 1 In a series of speeches across
Canada, he has explained his conception of modem law.
Hartt's approach is in the popular style of Charles A. Reich. The
latter has written that "for one interested in basic change, law and
political institutions are virtually irrelevant (except as theatres in
which to stage exemplary battles of consciousness)." '3 2 The rules
and institutions, then, are relatively unimportant. Modem law may
involve the official enforcement of certain values and attitudes
which may not be shared by all sectors of society, with the possible
imposition by the state of one consciousness on another
consciousness. Thus Mr. Justice Hartt has castigated, as an elitist
fiction, the idea that law can today embody mainstream thinking; it
is a fiction, he believes, that the state can understand best the people's
total generalised self-interest and can make laws to regulate society
in accordance with it; it is a myth that the law can represent agreed
public values. The following are major tenets of his philosophy:
Impatience, confrontation, multiplying pluralism, ephemeralisation,
and institutional fragmentation are rapidly becoming accepted features
of our society. We are, however, not dealing solely with a legal crisis,
but rather with a breakdown of the underlying order upon which law is
based. The social system associated with industrial society into which
most of us were born is dying. It is all part of a much larger revolution;
the shift to a new post-industrial society is taking place. And, whether
we like it or not, we must accept that this new era will be radically
different from the world with which we are familiar and which we
would naturally like to see maintained. Instead, the new order will have
fragmented value systems, new institutions, and different conceptions
of reality and eternity. Our present legal institutions were designed to
31. The first Chairman of the Commission is the Honourable E. Patrick Hartt, a
member of the Supreme Court of Ontario. The Honourable Antonio Lamer of the
Superior Court of Quebec is Vice-Chairman. Mr. Justice Hartt's appointment was
effective April 1st, 1971, and that of Mr. Justice Lamer December 1st. Both the
Chairman and the Vice-Chairman were granted leaves of absence from their
judicial duties in order to serve in these capacities. Dr. Martin L. Friedland of the
University of Toronto and William F. Ryan, Q.C., former Dean of the Faculty of
Law at the University of New Brunswick, were appointed as the full-time
members. Dr. Friedland resigned as of July 1, 1972, in order to return to the
University of Toronto. Dr. J. W. Mohr, a professor at Osgoode Hall Law School
and the Department of Sociology, York University, was appointed to replace Dr.
Friedland. Mme. Claire Barrette-Joncas, a member of the Bar of the Province of
Quebec and Mr. John D. McAlpine, who practices in Vancouver, were appointed
to serve as part-time members of the Commission, each for a period of three years.
Mine. Barrette-Joncas was appointed on June Ist and Mr. McAlpine on December
1st, 1971. First Annual Report, 1971-72, 2-3.
32. The Greening of America (New York: Bantam Books, 1971) 330.
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serve a social order that, if not already dead, is dying. It is unrealistic
to expect that, unchanged, they are capable of playing a significant role
in the radically new world that is already upon us .

. .

. I believe that in

many crucial instances the criminal law can no longer be an instrument
by which we express our choice of one set of values over another.
the means by which multiple sets of
Rather, I see the law as providing
33
values can co-exist and develop.
Instead of transmitting mainstream values which no longer exist, the
law must try to develop into an instrument of minimum intervention."
"In such a world, what becomes of the law? A good law has two
characteristics. First, it must genuinely have the capacity to regulate
conduct: in other words it must be workable in real life. Secondly, it
'4

must be based on values shared by those it affects .

. .

. In the history

of law, there have been many landmarks indicating that laws which
react rather5 than respond to situations are a prime cause of
alienation.3

In our developing democratic society laws must be regarded as
something more than an authoritative ordering of social relations.
Rather, they should properly be looked upon as the ever-changing
attempts by the state, through the rule-making power, to balance
conflicting values in order to maximise the potential for all to live in the
manner they choose free from unwarranted interference by the state or
otherwise. In a free, pluralistic society every citizen should be free to
adopt his own ethic, choose his own life style, and live his own life;
provided that36he does not fall below a minimum standard of acceptable
public order.
The law of the future, then, will operate in a society where the rate
of change will be intense and the amount of available knowledge
enormous. Thus law reform must respond to the research techniques
available and must focus on the legal process at work. Drawing its
inspiration from realist and sociological jurisprudence, it must
sound out popular attitudes, acquire factual bases for its
assumptions, be keenly aware of the policies and functions of law in
the community. The law that may be needed in the future may be
quite unlike the law that we know today.
Does a philosophical approach also emerge in the publications of
the commission?3 7 It was evident in the commission's study paper
33. "The Limitations of Legislative Reform". An address given to the Manitoba
Law School Foundation, Winnipeg, Manitoba on November 6, 1973.
34. Address given at the 13th Annual Conference of the American Judges
Association at Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, Mass. on October 23,
1973.
35. "Cause and Effect in Law" An address given at St. Thomas University,
Fredericton, N.B. on May 14, 1973.
36. "Some Thought on the Criminal Law and the Future". George M. Duck
Lecture delivered at the University of Windsor on April 5, 1972.
37. Seesupra, n.28.
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on obscenity, where an abstract statement of principles was
presented. The Second Working Paper on Strict Liability can also
be characterised as philosophical. It deals with principles, seeking
to discover basic difficulties rather than concentrating on technical
revision of the rules. Similarly, the Third Working Paper on
Sentencing and Dispositions is a general outline of principles. This
general approach is expressed and explained in the following
passage from the Fourth Working Paper on Discovery in the
Criminal Process: "Having fixed the importance of discovery in the
criminal process and having determined that, in the main, it does
not exist, the point has been reached at which something precise can
be said about the kind of discovery procedure that our criminal law
system ought to have. The emphasis here is on articulating
principles of general application and on drawing the general
contours of a discovery system. The exact details of a model that
will faithfully achieve these principles and locate the boundaries of
38
the system can be left until later."
No philosophical approach is evident in the publications on
evidence.39 There the paper begins with a textbook narration of the
present law, concentrating on the details of the rules, followed by a
listing of criticisms thereof, proposed reforms, the balancing of
arguments, and, finally, draft legislation with explanatory notes.
Why has there been no basic investigation of the nature and function
of evidence? The subject is suited to such an inquiry, as is any
subject. I suggest that the commission's researches in evidence are
incomplete. The proposed reforms to the rules may be desirable but
we can only be confident that they will be a genuine improvement if
all methods of inquiry are utilised.
The Comparative Method: Whilst a philosophical approach may
be peculiar to the Law Reform Commission of Canada, the
comparative method has long been recognised as a useful and valid
method of research for the law reform agency. However, the
Canadian bi-jural system makes such an approach more than
desirable; it becomes essential. The Law Reform Commission Act
38. Op. cit., at 25.
39. The first evidence study paper on Competence and Compellability was
severely criticized in an editorial in (1972), 15 C.L.Q. 1: ."Study Papers' is a
somewhat pedantic title for what the Commission has released. 'Position papers
with tentative recommendations' would be rather more accurate, for they contain
no authorities, footnotes or references and evince rather more provocative stances
and rather less study than one would expect .... There is a difference between
sounding out public opinion and yielding to it."
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reflects this by expressly including among the objects of the
commission, "the reflection in and by the law of the distinctive
concepts and institutions of the common law and civil law legal
systems in Canada, and the reconciliation of differences and
discrepancies in the expression and application of the law arising
40
out of differences in those concepts and institutions."
The Act possibly confuses aims with methods. The aim of law
reform is improvement, not uniformity; consideration of other
systems is a means of discovering what is a possible improvement;
it is not an end of law reform. At the same time, the Act does not
suggest that comparative research should be restricted to comparison of the Quebec system with the Canadian common law systems.
The commission has studied methods throughout the common law
and civil law worlds, including a study by the evidence project of
the Israeli system of examining child witnesses by trained youth
interrogators.
The commission has recognised in particular the lessons to be
drawn from the civil law method of drafting, thereby concentrating
on "differences ....

in the expression .

. .

. of the law."

"An

intriguing argument is made by Professor Clarence Smith of the
University of Ottawa that if one drafts initially in French in the
civilian style and then translates into English one can achieve more
clarity than if one starts drafting in the traditional common law style
in English." 4 1 Some of the problems involved in effecting law
reform by legislation could be overcome by improvement in
legislative style; comparative study of the civil method affords the
most likely means of making changes for the better.
Empirical Research: The Second Annual Report of the
commission declares that, "As a Commission we are committed to
the principle of empirical research. Our first job is to discover the
actual living law, the law that really governs Canadian people. For
this it is not enough to rely on conventional wisdom, popular belief
and traditional assumptions. Experiment, questionnaires, surveys
and all the other weapons of the social scientists must be called into
play." 4 2 Perhaps to this Annual Report should have been added the
note which appears on the commission's study papers: "This report
does not represent the views of the Commission." 43
40. R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23, s.Il(b).
41. M. L. Friedland, op. cit., at 62.
42. Op. cit., at 9.
43. Infra.
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The commission's resort to empirical research has been sporadic.
None of the published reports on evidence refers to such work being
done. Similarly, with the papers on obscenity, fitness to stand trial,
and criminal costs it is unclear whether factual investigations were
made. The Second Annual Report" does, however, detail empirical
research in progress and, following the statement, "In the field of
evidence empirical research is particularly necessary'' 45 , states the
need for information on the effect on juries of rules of evidence and
describes an empirical inquiry into police questioning and
confessions. 4 6 Two of the later papers reveal the use of empirical
research. The Second Working Paper on Strict Liability shows that
statistics were compiled on the number of existing offences and the
details of their enforcement 47 ; these statistics were used to
formulate general recommendations. In the Fourth Working Paper
on Discovery in Criminal Proceedings a questionnaire was used to
formulate the recommendations. Questionnaires were sent to
prosecutors and defence counsel across Canada in order to
determine the nature and extent of informal discovery practices .48
Consultation with field workers has been extensive. 4 9 Clearly the
contribution of persons involved in the day-to-day operation of the
legal system is vital to effective law reform. Limiting law reform
deliberations to a judicial and administrative legal elite runs the risk
of accepting unreal assumptions as to what happens and what is
required. The commission has also engaged in one experiment, the
East York project, described as follows in the First Annual Report:
The project has as its purpose the definition of situations that give rise to
invocation of the criminal law sanction; the evaluation of the
effectiveness of existing methods of crime prevention and control; and
the development of alternative modes for the resolution of disputes. The
demonstration project is being carried out in East York in the police
patrol district near Danforth and Main Street designated as patrol area
5411, with the cooperation of the Metropolitan Toronto Police and with
other specialized agencies. The project was discussed with the federal
Department of Justice, the Ontario Department of Justice, the Toronto
44. Op. cit. at 21-22.
45. Ibid., at 22.

46. Printed as "policy" in the Report.
47. Op. cit., at 10.
48. Op. cit., at 19-23. This questionnaire revealed considerable variation in the
practices of Crown prosecutors through Canada. The result was that certain
prosecutors inquired of the commission how they could improve their discovery
methods, a good example of a commission educating officials to change their
working behaviour.
49. Second Annual Report, 1972-73, 11, 22-23.
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Police Commission and the Metropolitan Toronto Police before it was
begun.
The East York project is seeking answers to a wide variety of questions,
including questions such as these: with what kinds of human and social
problems are the police now dealing; are present definitions of crime
adequate for the purposes of state intervention through the criminal
process; how are the police discharging the increasing demands made
upon them to perform tasks not strictly related to the enforcement of the
criminal law; how effective is the criminal law in resolving disputes that
exist between individuals or between an individual and a group; are
there alternatives to the present adversarial system and can these
alternatives work; is it possible in an urban community to develop better
relations between the police and the people in the community; what is
the best method of using the police to prevent as well as to detect crime;
how well is the new Bail Reform Act working; and what are the
economic and social costs of the criminal process? In seeking answers
with social
to these and others questions the project is cooperating
50
agencies and individual volunteers in the community.

The Second Annual Report explains that the commission will either
do empirical research itself or rely on suitable work done elsewhere.
The need for surveys and statistical information has, indeed, been
recognized in England 51 , so that at a seminar held in All Souls
College, Oxford in September 1972, "the principal positive
conclusion of the seminar was that some improvement might be
made in the use of the social sciences in the service of law
reform. ", 52 The trend, then, is clear and the appointment to the Law
Reform Commission of Canada of the sociologist Dr. Hans Mohr
was a vital step. But, one must ask, why has the commission not
fully practised what its Annual Reports preach? The answer is,
because of the scale of possible operation of the commission, a
theme to which I will return. 53
50. Op. cit., at 8-9.
51. "Our experience has caused us to give careful thought to ways and means of
making greater use of the social sciences both in determining law reform priorities
and in the preparation of proposals. It would be, in our opinion, dangerous to
assume that the working paper technique, because it is indispensable, is, therefore,
itself sufficient. During the year we introduced into the consultative phase of the
Family Property inquiry a new feature - the publication of a statistical survey
conducted at our request by the Social Survey Division of the Office of Population
Censuses and Surveys into the attitudes and actions of married people in respect of
their property. The report of this survey has added a new dimension to our study of
the subject. We hope to evolve a standard procedure for harnessing the social
sciences to law reform which will become as much a part of our method as the
working paper procedure itself." The Law Commission (England), Seventh
Annual Report, [1971-7], para.2.
52. The Law Commission (England), Eighth Annual Report, 1972-73, para. 76.
53. "Such an empirical approach to the whole of the criminal law lays a heavy
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Public Consultation: Section 12(1)(a) of the Law Reform
Commission Act empowers the commission to "receive and
consider any proposals for the reform of the law that may be made
or referred to it by any body or person." 5 4 Does this subsection
derive solely from the Canadian tradition of federal-provincial
consultation or are there other reasons why a law commission
should consult the public? One view is that law commission
consultation is merely an extension of Parliamentary consultation.
Thus Norman Marsh of the English Law Commission states that the
"Commission sees the ultimate object of the elaborate process of
consultation as assisting Parliament on matters of often great
technical detail which can seldom be adequately investigated in the
course of Parliamentary debate. This assistance is ineffective unless
the scope and nature of the consultation is clearly set out on the face
of the Report." 55 This process of consultation seems to be restricted
to experts familiar with the technical aspects. It is also conducted on
the understanding that change will be effected by legislation. In any
event, there is a need for consultation even within the framework of
law reform as rule revision by legislation.
Public consultation may be engaged in for the reason given by
Arthur T. Vanderbilt: "We should welcome the co-operation of
laymen who are interested in the law. The layman can ask questions
that will jar the complacency of the legal mind . .

.

. We need

laymen to remind us occasionally that the law is not the only angle
from which to view life, that law is not the only means of
burden on the Projects. It also makes reform a slow and long-term enterprise. On
the other hand, it forms the only basis for rational reform .... Consultation,

however, is a lengthy and time-consuming process, and the Commission is
currently considering how to make the best use of its limited resources and how
best to continue its dialogue with the public." Second Annual Report, 1972-73,
22-23.
54. R.S.C., 1970, 1st. Supp. c.23.
55. Op. cit., at 279-80. J.H. Farrar, op. cit., at 122-123 criticises the English
Commission for the narrow operation of its consultative methods: ".... .the
present system of working papers seems on the whole to work well. Nevertheless
consultation tends largely to be with pressure groups. In many cases this is
inevitable but it is not necessarily so. In their latest report the Law Commission say
they intend to use more social surveys presumably to explore social facts and
popular values. Consultation might be extended on certain topics to follow the
example of royal commissions, certain of the Canadian law commissions and
American legislative committees in having public hearings. Law Commission staff
could conduct these hearings. The Manitoba Law Commission advertises its
proposals and solicits views by advertisements in laymen's language in the popular
press. "
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maintaining the social order and of promoting individual
welfare." 5 6 Lay contribution may be valuable on all topics.
Subjects appearing as unfathomable mysteries when expressed in
the jargon of lawyers can easily be translated into social situations
intimately affecting the lives of all, so that lay contribution becomes
valuable. Consultation may also be carried on as a matter of
"working politics". A commonly voiced objection to the institution
of a permanent law commission was the fear that it would become a
"brains trust" or "third house". 5 7 A commission, then, must not
become the over-powerful enclave of an elitist faceless few. Solely
to overcome this charge it might engage in public consultation. A
variety of reasons for consultation is offered by L. Scarman, former
chairman of the English Law Commission:
.... it enables the layman's voice to be heard in the process of law
reform and it ensures that the Commission's first tentative proposals are
subject to the criticism of those who know where the shoe pinches. But
consultation offers other advantages. It helps to dispose of possible
misconceptions regarding the possible effects of the Commission's
proposals and thus improves the chance of our recommendations, when
finally put forward, being acceptable to a large section of the informed
public. Further, it helps to stimulate interest in law reform. And last,
but not the least of the advantages of open consultation: it helps the
legislature in the field of law reform. The Law Commission is an
advisory body and if it is to render effective assistance to Parliament it
must consult widely and set out in its final report the scope and nature of
the consultation. It is surely of critical importance to the legislature to
know, when legislation comes 58to be debated, what the balance of
opinion is on a particular subject.
An historical argument leads to a more fundamental reason why
consultation should occur. Law, government or state interference
has now invaded areas of human activity which traditionally were
regulated only by custom, market forces and social practices. As W.
Friedmann puts it, "Today, the legislature is everywhere heavily at
work, flanked by a multiplicity of administrative agencies on the
one side and a variety of judicial institutions on the other side. It
actively moulds and regulates the scope of business enterprise as
well as the property relations of families and even breeding habits.
Hire-purchase legislation strongly affects purchasing habits, while
zoning and town planning legislation has a decisive influence on the
56. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Challenge of Law Reform (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1955) 156.
57. J.Stone and G. S. Pettee, op. cit., at 228.
58. (1972), 1 Anglo-Am. L.R. 31, 36.
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pattern of land ownership and other property rights."- 5 9 The law,
then, should be keenly aware that it is intruding on areas where
there is a strong undercurrent of traditional practice, social attitude
and custom. Discovery of the popular attitudes and values becomes
essential. M. L. Friedland, speaking for the Law Reform Commission of Canada has explained the matter this way: "We are not
attempting to engage in this dialogue with the public as a public
relations gesture, but rather because the Commission feels that
60
public participation is an integral part of effective law reform." ,
Public participation is an "integral part of effective law reform"
for two reasons. First, because public opinion is an important part of
law. Lord Tangley has explained that:
In the last resort the state of the law must both reflect and depend on the
state of public opinion. By public opinion I do not mean merely the
whim of the moment but the convictions and beliefs, or even prejudices,
upon which the members of any given society habitually act. These are
the basic things by which a society holds together. Beliefs may be the
result of conscious, deliberate and rational thought and argument. For
the most part they are more likely to be the result of inherited
experience, teaching and tradition. There will always be a mixture of
prejudice and reason, of philosophic, economic and sociological
experiment and investigation on the one hand and folklore and old
wives' tales on the other. There will always be a cautious element which
desires to hold on firmly to inherited or conventional thought which has
proved its practical utility. There will always be questioning spirits
attracted by and looking out for novelty. Were it not so society would
become stagnant and decadent. On the other hand no society can safely
indulge the soaring ambitions of its questioning spirits unless it feels
sure enough of itself to be able to contain the new without fatal damage
to the old. A society can only feel secure in this sense if there is in fact a
strong enough body of accepted doctrine. No law can be effective for
long.unless it is in line with this accepted doctrine. 61
What should be these popular values which the law embodies? They
should not be those personal to the law commissioners. By
consulting the public, we avoid the danger of dictation by the few;
do we open the door to dictation by the majority? The Second
Annual Report, 1972-73, of the Law Reform Commission of
Canada explains that "the values the Commission seeks are not
simply values of its own preference, nor are they the values held
currently by the majority of Canadians. They are those values
which, in the light of general views current in Canadian society,
59. W. Friedmann, op. cit., at 21.

60. M. L. Friedland,op. cit., at 60.
61. Lord Tangley, New Law for a New World? (Hamlyn Lecture Series) (London:
Steven & Sons, 1965) 3.
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could best be rationally supported and defended. ' 62 The commission, then, is not dictating its own values, neither is it proposing the
views now held by a majority as ascertained by opinion poll. It is
seeking, and suggesting that the law should embody, views which
are (a) held in society and (b) rationally defensible. If only
rationally held views are sought, public consultation must include a
process of public education. The attitudes on what law is needed
must be based on reality not myth. They must be informed attitudes
arrived at after full debate. Consultation, then, involves four stages:
(i) discovering present attitudes; (ii) discovering the grounds for
holding those attitudes; (iii) informing on the merits of the grounds
and attitudes; (iv) discovering the attitudes of the informed public.
Public participation is an "integral part of effective law reform"
because, secondly, the most fundamental means of achieving
reform is by changing public opinion. Perhaps this is the only means
of effecting reform. Such a suggestion contradicts the following
passage from Lord Lloyd of Hampstead: "The history of law reform
is not likely to be a very illuminating one if no move can be made,
however desirable it may be demonstrated to be, until popular
sentiment can be fully mobilized in favour of the change, lest the
whole authority of the law be whittled away. Indeed, as we have
seen, it is often only with the change in the law itself that popular
opinion is gradually re-moulded to a more enlightened
viewpoint." 6 3 But this passage is, with respect, open to a number
of objections: the suggestion that law and opinion are separate, the
assumption that statutory change is the only means of reform, the
assumption that statutory change is reform at all, and the belief that
the content of the rulebook can cause opinion to change. Formal
revisions may affect outward behaviour when there is no united and
widespread feeling hostile to the revisions but their influence on
popular attitudes is unlikely. To be sure, changes in opinions have
followed revision of rules but the new sentiments have usually
resulted from the general educational process. The legislative
amendment may or may not give an initial spur to the educative
forces; it is mainly important to the extent that it is a part of a
learning process.
Of the various methods of achieving change, changing public
opinion is the most difficult to achieve. Mr. Justice Hartt has
62. Op. cit., at 9.
63. Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, The Idea of Law (London: Penguin Books,
1973) 63.
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commented on the fragmentation of values and the breakdown of
mainstream attitudes in contemporary society.6 4 Does this not make
the task of effecting reform by mobilizing public opinion even more
difficult? Probably not, if we distinguish attitudes on a particular
issue and attitudes towards others holding different attitudes. After
the educational stage required in the consultative process, there may
be unanimous agreement on an issue so that an inevitable
substantive change is achieved. Or, after the process, the parties
may still differ but with appreciation of the opposing view. The law
would either embody the consensus on the substantive question or a
result reflecting the agreement to differ. In either case law reform
has been achieved by changing attitudes. The second is perhaps the
more desirable situation since it ensures a continuing dialogue on
the law. The fragmentation of values emphasizes the need to consult
the public since the state can no longer dictate, through the law, its
conception of what society needs.
Whether we look at the situation from the point of view of what is
being changed or the means of change, what is needed is a learning
situation. Similarly, whether popular ideas are the method of
change itself or are a source of ideas for statutory reform, those
ideas must be properly formed. What has the Law Reform
Commission of Canada done to create this learning situation, to see
that popular views are informed views? How is the commission
achieving its "sort of Open Forum on the law", a conception of its
function which the Second Annual Report, 1972-73, declares that it
65
is pleased to accept?
4.

ChangingPublic Opinion

First, the commission recognises that the educative process should
begin early: "For this reason the Commission is particularly
anxious to encourage and improve courses on law in the schools.
Preliminary steps are already being taken. The Commission is
encouraging the preparation of a special course of a jurisprudential
kind to enable high school students to grapple with the basic issues.
And the Commission takes every opportunity to meet students either
here at the Commission or in the schools themselves." 6 6 In 1974
the Department of Law at Carleton University held a workshop for
64. Supra.
65. Op. cit., at 12.
66. Second Annual Report, 1972-73, 13.
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teachers of law in high schools or elsewhere outside of universities.
This conference was encouraged and supported by the commission
and staff and members of the commission participated in its
sessions. Secondly, the process of public consultation has been
applied not only at the level of determining views on particular law
reform proposals but also at the initial stage of determining what
topics the commission should consider at all. The commission's
work on family law was begun in response to opinions received that
it should be studied.67

Thirdly, the commission's working procedure has been, first, the
publication by a project group of a study paper (which does not
express the views of the commission) inviting comments, then, of a
commission working paper, written in the light of public reaction to
the study paper and again inviting comment, and, finally,
publication of a report to the Minister of Justice for his
consideration and for tabling in Parliament. 6 8 The publication of
preliminary papers is a technique developed by the English Law
Commission; it has not been widely adopted by other commissions,
which publish only a final report. L. C. B. Gower believes that the
distribution of preliminary papers is an improvement on the
technique of inviting written memoranda which can be merely
repetitious essays written in ignorance of what others are saying.
"The working paper gives consultees something to get their teeth
into and avoids unnecessary secrecy about the likely lines of the
proposed reform. We regarded this practice as our major
contribution towards the methodology of law reform and claimed
the credit for its invention.' '69 Until recently the Canadian
commission's method included the first stage of publication of a
study paper, a procedure apparently peculiar to this commission.
The idea of the study paper has been to allow the project group full
freedom to suggest recommendations thought desirable. Study
papers will continue to be produced on evidence and some other
topics but in future the emphasis of the commission will be on the
immediate production of working papers. 70 The change in
procedure has been caused by the delay - as much as one year in receiving substantial feedback on study papers. The initiative in
the preparation of immediate working papers will still lie with the
67.
68.
69.
70.

First Annual Report, 1971-72, 5.
The Commission has not yet submitted a final report on a study topic.
at 263.
L. C. B. Gower, op. cit.,
See supra, n.28.
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project group but the power of final decision on the publication of
the first paper is now transferred to the commissioners.
Fourthly, the recent style and presentation of the commission's
publications displays a concern to maximise readership. This can
hardly be said of the early technical papers on evidence and criminal
procedure. But the recent papers have appeared in popular
soft-bound booklet form. Since 1973, commission publications
have appeared in French, in newsheet form, as a supplement to Le
Bureau 73 and, since 1974, in newsheet form, in English, as a
supplement to The National, the newspaper of the Canadian Bar
Association. Attached to Working Paper I on the Family Court was
even a brochure, complete with cartoons, outlining the questions
raised in the working paper, the newsheet working paper itself being
illustrated by cartoons depicting scenes of marital strife. The
concern of the working papers to evoke questions of principle rather
than discussion of details no doubt attracts a wider readership.
Working Paper II, "The Meaning of Guilt", concerned with strict
liability, is particularly deserving of appreciation. 7 1 First, the title,
"The Meaning of Guilt", is well chosen to attract the layman; a title
such as "The Problem of Strict Liability" would have been less
successful. The paper is of manageable length: thirty-eight pages of
English and fourty-four of French, published as a small soft-bound
book; seven pages of English as a newsheet. In style the paper is
light and readable with technicality agreeably absent; at the same
time it is not sensational but balanced and accurate. There is little
citation of cases or statutes and few footnotes. The paper is so
presented as to appeal to the widest market, but not for the sole reason
that like all commission publications it is available free of charge.
Fifthly, the commission's method of demystifying its publications is similar to its attempts to demystify statutes. 72 Thus the
process of making the statutes comprehensible to all is also part of
the educative function of the commission. Sixthly, the commission
has sponsored a series of weekly law reform discussions at the
71. The character of this paper can best be appreciated by comparing it with the

equivalent English Law Commission publication, Published Working Paper No.
30, "Strict Liability and the Enformcement of the Factories Act 1961" 2 June,
1970. This latter, which runs to 66 pages of foolscap, is a report prepared by
members of the Sub-Faculty of Law of the University of Kent at Canterbury.
Beginning with an outline of the Factories Act legislation and the enforcement
procedure, the report then describes a survey made of enforcement practices from
which it draws conclusions and makes specific recommendations.
72. Supra.
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Glebe Community Centre in Ottawa. These sessions were
advertised in the community newspaper with the heading "Law
Reform is Your Business" and members of the public were invited
to take copies of publications of the commission to study in advance
of informal meetings addressed by representatives of the commission. The scheme, held from January to March 1974, was a pilot
project designed to ascertain whether a more extensive program of
citizen participation throughout Canada would be useful. In the
words of the newspaper advertisement, the purpose of the meetings
was "to facilitate informed participation by the public", with a
view to providing citizens with an opportunity (a) "to learn
something of legal philosophy and the views of their fellow
citizens" and (b) "to contribute to wise and effective laws."
The meetings were small, with an average attendance of thirteen
people. (The population of the Glebe district of Ottawa is fifteen
thousand.) They attracted mostly men and women of the
professional class. Greater numbers and a broader spectrum of
people could be attracted by investment in radio or television
broadcasting but the element of active participation might then be
lacking. Given the present state of public understanding of the law,
it was the learning-by-the-public function which was pronounced.
The educative value of the meetings to the small numbers attending
was undoubted and the meetings seemed useful for discovering
topics of popular concern. (The activities of professional criminals
and of practising lawyers were frequently expressed matters of
complaint, as were delays in court proceedings, lack of uniformity
of laws in Canada, infringements of civil liberties, and the
undemocratic character of the law making process.) Criticisms were
made of the substance and style of the commission papers: more
empirical information was requested and the papers were also
critizised for their generality. The value of the meetings to the
commission "experts" seemed limited to ensuring that their
proposals did not meet with strong opposition. It was unlikely that
anything new would have emerged from the meetings after the
commission had engaged in lengthy research, but the meetings
served the useful purpose of ensuring that the commission's
proposals were not completely alien to the values of a small sample
of community members. 73 The commission is now considering
73. I base my comments on observation of two meetings which were described as
"successful" by the co-ordinator and on study of the co-ordinator's report.

The Law Reform Commission of Canada 87

whether to undertake a nationwide extension of the project and how
such meetings can most productively be organised.
Generally, then, the law should reflect popular consciousness;
however, the system that is sought can be is settled only after
informed debate. In criminal law, for example, sound factual bases
of the actual incidence of criminal behaviour must be the starting
point for discussion; the classes of persons incarcerated and the
typical situations leading to criminal conduct must be realised; the
dubious utility of the vast anti-crime industry will only be perceived
if the facts of its operation are known and understood. Thus
philosophical, comparative and empirical research needs to be
carried out in order to provide guidelines for the reformers and
informing the public.
I remarked earlier that the Law Reform Commission of Canada
has not always practised what its annual reports preached. Thus,
certain research techniques had not on occasions been used and I
suggested that this was because full enquiry was beyond the
resources of the commission. Similarly the Second Annual Report,
1972-73, confesses to disappointment at the amount of public
interest and discussion generated by the commission's study paper
on obscenity. 74 One might ask, is the public ever going to be moved
to an interest in the law by -the conunission's present scale of
operation? If public reaction was not forthcoming on such an
apparently attractive subject as obscenity, what is the hope of
sparking interest in some of the more technical or esoteric branches
of our law? Jean Beetz has stated the problem as follows: "Old rules
might also survive relatively unchanged for the simple reason that
those who are advocating their repeal or amelioration have failed to
get attention in the contemporary proliferation of suggested
improvements and novelties. One may have recourse to various
means of achieving this attention ranging from the techniques of
advertising to the use of violence, but we may rapidly reach a
saturation point where modem man's capacity for attention, pity or
indignation has become glutted and where he puts his soul to sleep,
75
from time to time, in a reflex to retain his sanity."
How can a law commission draw public attention to the problems
of the law? "Our experience with participatory democracy has
proved worthwhile, although somewhat disappointing. The com74. Op. cit., at 12.
75. Jean Beetz, op. cit., at 131.
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ments we have received - and there have been several hundred of
them - have been articulate, intelligent and helpful. However, we
did not get the widespread response that some of us hoped we
would. Any of you who have had experience on any body seeking
comment from the legal profession or the public know that perhaps
the only thing that will get a strong response is the failure to ask for
a response." 7 6 Thus a commission might deliberately ignore the
public or make outrageous suggestions in the certain knowledge that
widespread public and press reaction will follow. The irony of the
non-consultative work of the Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee is that it provoked a uniquely intense and
widespread level of debate, with meetings, symposia, leading
articles in the press 77 and a television documentary, much of the
discussion being prompted by the political implications of the
recommendations. 78 However, the suggestion that a law commission should deliberately inflame the public by ignoring it is clearly
too devious to be publicly acceptable.
The solution must be an extension of the advertising, public
relations and general operation of the Law Reform Commission of
Canada. Would a vastly increased expenditure on law reform allowing full empirical and consultative research - be publicly
acceptable? It should be. Given that law is the structure for our
political, economic and social existence - indeed, it is life in
society itself - and given the traditional alienation of the people
from "law" and lawyers, is the time not overdue to devote
extensive energy and resources to questioning the fundamental
assumptions of our present legal system and to putting the power of
legal change back into the hands of all people in society where it
belongs? In the fiscal year ending March 31, 1973, the total cost of
the program of the Law Reform Commission of Canada was
$1,200,000, the total cost of the Department of Justice's program
being $33,837,000. 7 9 At the same time, the "budget for the
76. M. L. Friedland, op. cit., at 59-60.
77. The Times, June 28, 1972; The Guardian, June 28, 1972; Sunday Times, July
2, 1972; The Observer, July 2, 1972.
78. To the irony that the Eleventh Report succeeded in arousing widespread public
discussion can now be added the fact that it has inspired empirical research to
question certain of the assumptions made by the Committee. See M. Zander, "Are
too many professional criminals avoiding conviction? A study in Britain's two
busiest courts" (1974), 37 M.L.R. 28.
79. Vol. 1 Public Accounts of Canada for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1973,
Details of Expenditure and Revenues, Section 11.4.
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administration of criminal justice for all jurisdictions in Canada has
increased by 400% in the last ten years. At the present time the
direct cost of dealing with crime in this country is approximately
one billion, three hundred million dollars per year. This includes the
cost of courts, judges, penitentiaries, police and correctional
services but does not include indirect costs such as welfare for
families of the incarcerated. The allocation for the criminal courts is
estimated at one hundred million dollars or only 8% of that total
budget." 8 0 In this light, ought we not attempt to find out whether
this immense anti-crime industry is necessary, desirable or
productive and whether its winding up and liquidation would be
popularly acceptable? G. Sawer's comment on the English position
is also illuminating: "....
the English investment in law reform
- investment in skill and money - is microscopic compared with
the investment in scientific and industrial research and
development."-8 1 If the present scale of operation of the Law
Reform Commission of Canada makes for difficulties in applying
the necessary research methods is not a massive injection of further
resources called for? The alternative of requiring the commission to
assume the traditional role of rule reviser, a function which it could
easily discharge within its present budget, seems negative,
pessimistic and unproductive when seen in the long-term.
There is a need to recruit more questioning minds to the law
reform process. It is apparent that so long as legal education in
Canada is restricted to vocational training, no fundamental
reappraisal of our law is going to occur. 82 Changes need to be made
in the legal mind and outlook. "The lawyer must consider himself
increasingly as part of a team, involved in the long-term planning
processes in which systems analysis will require the integration of
the lawyer's skill with those of the economist, the social worker, the
scientist, the engineer, the industrial manager.' -8 A revival of the
teaching of jurisprudence would go some way to easing the
situation. Stimulating the study of sociology of law would be even
better. The process of law reform itself should become a focal point
80. Mr. Justice E. Patrick Hartt, "The Limitations of Legislative Reform", An
address given to the Manitoba Law School Foundation, Winnipeg, Manitoba on
November 6, 1973.
81. G. Sawer, op. cit., at 183.
82. "Any law school which lifts its sights beyond the traditional role of training
law students and faces the problem of law reform is properly called a law centre."
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, op. cit., at 155-6.
83. W. Friedmann, op. cit.,
at 520.
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of study. As G. Sawer has observed, "I think we have now reached
the stage where the continuous reform of the law should be a topic
of study and instruction in law faculties." 4 The Law Reform
Commission of Canada's recent attempts to reappraise the meaning
and technique of law reform would benefit from concentrated work
on the subject in the law schools and elsewhere. The skills,
experience and knowledge required of law reformers must expand
to meet the challenge of the discipline and the proliferation of
available information.
A commonly heard criticism of the Law Reform Commission of
Canada is, "Why isn't it doing anything?" But the better question
to ask is, how best can a national law commission operate? This
question involves the discovery of a role for the Law Commission of
Canada different from that of other existing agencies of so-called
law reform or law revision, such as, royal commissions, ad hoc
committees, university journals, government departments, and
professional organisations. It also involves learning from the work
of other commissions. The Law Reform Commission should settle
on the role of educational catalyst seeking to ensure that the legal
system operates in an informed environment. By establishing this
environment, not by changing rules and institutions, a humane, just
and responsive legal system will be achieved. ". . . there always
seems to be an overlap between the period of thought and the period
of legislation and subsequent practical development. By this I mean
that the law and institutions of today naturally reflect the thought
and necessities of a previous generation. It takes about a generation
for thought to go through the inevitable process of propaganda,
discussion and argument before there is a sufficient consensus to
justify the acceptance or putting into effect of new ideas. Even then
there has to be the spur of a widely-felt necessity." '85 This is the
time scale that genuine law reform requires.
84. G. Sawer, op. cit., at 185. D. B. King, "The Law Reform Challenge"
(1968-69), 13 St. Louis L.J. 403.
85. Lord Tangley, op. cit., at 1.

